外文翻譯---在分稅制度股利政策與資本結構下的決策

1、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes</p><p>　　1、The interaction of capital struc

2、ture and dividend policy</p><p>　　Firm values are normalized with respect to the firm with zero debt and zero dividend payout. The panels in the figure indicate that the combined net impact of corporate divi

3、dend and capital structure policies on firm value is directly affected by the pertinent tax rates at the time.</p><p>　　We next discuss the implications of the model for dividend and capital structure polici

4、es under several historical tax regimes. Three representative tax regimes (1979–1981, 1988–1990, 1993–2002) were chosen for analysis out of the ten that were in existence at some time during the three decades since 1979.

5、 The three representative tax regimes exhibit distinctly different set of tax rates both in terms of absolute values and relative to each other. For this reason, these three contrasting regimes</p><p>　　2、Ye

6、ars 1979–1981</p><p>　　The application of the model using the tax rates from the period 1979–1981 reveals a subtle effect. The table and the figure depict normalized firm value, VD,Π/V0,0, as a function of t

7、he leverage D and the dividend payout π. The gain from leverage is positive only when the firm is at a relatively high payout ratio (above approximately 40%), with the maximum gain occurring at full (100%) payout. Intere

8、stingly, at a dividend payout level lower than 40%, increasing leverage lowers firm value.</p><p>　　The reversal of the leverage effect at lower payout ratios is driven by the relative levels of tax rates. D

9、uring the years 1979–1981, the top marginal tax rate for personal income was very high in comparison to the tax rate for corporate income (70% and 46% respectively). In a tax rate environment such as this, high taxes pai

10、d by the bondholders for their interest income proceeds exceed the benefit from the tax deductibility of interest payments at the firm level. Since debt financing can be ass</p><p>　　Another noteworthy obser

11、vation about the 1979–1981 tax rate environment is the steep loss in firm value at very low debt levels in response to increasing dividend payout. According to our model, it was possible for an all-equity firm to experie

12、nce losses in value up to 58%. The firm could mitigate this loss by maintaining a higher debt level.</p><p>　　The tax regime that made the interesting features discussed above possible is not a short-term an

13、omaly confined to the years 1979–1981. Indeed, the entire period between the Great Depression and the late 1970s was characterized by a similar tax rate environment. Our model indicates that optimal policies to maximize

14、firm value under such tax regimes required zero debt and zero dividend payout. This prescription interestingly comports with the observed leverage policies of the time, when numerous </p><p>　　3、Years 1988–1

15、990 (and 1991–1992)</p><p>　　The situation during the years 1988–1990 is unique because during that time the top marginal tax rates on ordinary income (thus on dividend and interest income) were nominally th

16、e same as the tax rate on capital gains at 28%. In the following 2 years (1991–1992), the two tax rates remained very close (at 31.0% and 28.9% respectively). The result of the convergence in tax rates is visible in Fig.

17、 2 for the1988–1990 and 1991–1992 panels. There is little if any moderating influence of the dividend </p><p>　　4、Years 1993–2002</p><p>　　In contrast to the reversal effect observed under the t

18、ax regime during 1979–1981, and similar to the situation during 1988–1992, the gain from leverage is always positive under the 1993–2002 tax regimes. The details of the gain from leverage relation and the effect of the d

19、ividend payout for the years 1993–1994 and the year 2002 are available. As a departure from the previous tax regimes discussed above, throughout this decade-long time interval, the gain from leverage is significantly mor

20、e pro</p><p>　　In contrast to the maximum potential gain from leverage during 1988–1992 that reached up to 50%, the tax rate changes throughout the 1990s significantly reduced the maximum potential gain. the

21、 maximum potential gain was near 30% in 1993, and by 1998, approximately 20%,remaining at that level through 2002. </p><p>　　5、Summary and empirical implications </p><p>　　The nature of the comb

22、ined impact of financial leverage and dividend policy on firm value over the years 1979–2002 is found to be wide ranging as a direct result of the tax rate changes. We discussed above three distinct tax regime environmen

23、ts in detail. In the first interval 1979–1981, low leverage and low dividend payout leads to higher firm value. However, given a high dividend payout, the firm is better off by carrying a high debt level. That suggests a

24、 simultaneous increase or decrease in </p><p>　　The same logic applies throughout the years following the 1979–1981 time interval up to 1987 and again after 1992. During the years 1979–1987, the tax rate wer

25、e such that at low debt levels, firm value declined with increasing dividend payout ratios. Similarly, from 1993 until 2002, firms would suffer losses in value if they chose to increase dividend payout while maintaining

26、low debt levels. In contrast, during the 1988–1992 time interval, there was no penalty for having a high dividend payout </p><p>　　The breakdown in the interaction of dividend payout and capital structure du

27、ring the 1988–1992 time period as implied by our model provides an opportunity to test the model empirically. If our model is a reasonable representation of the dividend payout-capital structure interaction under varying

28、 tax rate environments, we would expect a positive association between dividend payout and debt levels during the years 1979–1987 and 1993–2002 During the years 1988–1992, the association between dividend</p><

29、p>　　It is worth noting that, to the extent firms have shifted their distributions to their shareholders from dividends to stock repurchases over time, our empirical analysis, which only uses dividend payout data, wil

30、l not be able to pick up this trend. Indeed, during the three decades under study there was a shift in firms’ attitudes toward share repurchases vis-à-vis dividend payout. We do not pursue stock repurchases empirica

31、lly in this study due to data limitations. However, note that the model </p><p>　　In this paper we develop a valuation model that ties together capital structure and dividend payout polices while incorporati

32、ng differential tax rates on dividend distributions and capital gains. As such it is an extension of the original Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend policy model and of the Miller (1977) model. We numerically and grap

33、hically demonstrate the implications of this new model under ten different tax regimes in effect since 1979 and derive the implications of the model for fi</p><p>　　Our analysis indicates a wide range of fir

34、m values depending on the particular set of tax rates applicable at the time. In the first interval, 1979–1981, when the tax regime featured a high rate on dividend income in comparison to the rates on corporate income a

35、nd personal capital gains, increasing financial leverage would lead to losses in firm value, if the dividend payout was relatively small. At dividend payout ratios below 40%, the loss in firm value in response to increas

36、ed debt ratio coul</p><p>　　Using the analysis of the valuation model under a diverse set of tax regimes, we develop several predictions for empirical testing. The results of the empirical tests are strongly

37、 supportive of the basic predictions of our analysis in a static setting. The interaction between dividend policy and financial leverage decisions is significantly influenced by the prevailing tax rates. The more dynamic

38、 predictions of the model remain for subsequent examination.</p><p>　　By design, our tax-based model abstracts from the well-known and important contributions of previous studies on bankruptcy/financial dist

39、ress costs, agency considerations, and signaling theories. However, the insights gained from our extended tax-based model could contribute in a significant way to the understanding of corporate financial policy in both r

40、esearch and policy dimensions. It is a well established notion within the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure that a range of debt </p><p>　　In the near future, another major change in the U.S. t

41、ax environment is possible, especially if the JGTRRA is allowed to expire by the Congress. The ability of the model in this paper to easily incorporate the new levels of marginal tax rates on four types of income makes i

42、t a useful tool for corporate decision makers in analyzing dividend and debt decisions. For purposes of research, the model can be used to gain insights into the evolution of dividend policy over the past three decades.&

43、lt;/p><p>　　Source: Ufuk Ince and James E. Owers. 2003 “The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes”. Journal of Economics and Finance, August, pp

44、. 29-32.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　在分稅制度股利政策與資本結構下的決策</p><p>　　1、互動的資本結構和股利政策 </p><p>　　公司價值方面進行歸一零債務和零股利支出?；诠緝r值上的公司股利和資本結構政策所帶來的公司合并凈影響是直接與當時的相關稅率掛鉤。

45、</p><p>　　我們接下來討論在不同歷史稅制下的股利和資本政策模型所帶來的影響。三個有代表性的稅收制度（1979-1981年，1988-1990年，1993-2002年）被選定為用于分析出自從1979年開始三十年期間存在的十個。三個有代表性的稅收制度無論從絕對價值還是彼此間的相對價值來看都體現出截然不同的稅率組合。出于這個原因，這三個截然不同的制度提供了一個合適的設置來測試我們的模型的價值含義。如果我們的模

46、型提供了公司的資本結構和股利政策決定合理的表述，那么這三種截然不同的稅制將會成為在模型預測和經驗性觀察中尋找合適點的理想環境。</p><p>　　2、1979-1981年</p><p>　　運用從1979年和1981年期間稅率的模型的應用揭示了一個微妙的影響，表和圖描繪了代表杠桿和股利支出功能的規格化公司價值，VD，Π/V0,0。杠桿收益只有當公司處在一個相對高的派息率（約40％以上）

47、，并且伴有在全額支出（100%）下的最大增益的情況下才為正。有趣的是，在分紅水平低于40％的情況下，提升了的杠桿效應卻降低了公司價值。杠桿效應的支付率較低狀況的逆轉是由稅率的相對水平所驅使造成的。</p><p>　　1979-1981年期間，個人所得稅的最高邊際稅率相比較于企業所得稅率已經是相當高的了（70%和46%），在這樣的稅率環境，為他們所得的利息收入債券持有人支付高額稅收超過從在企業層面的利息減稅好處。

48、因為債務融資可以被假定為具有零凈現值，這個額外的負擔是由股東承擔。在派息水平高，另一方面，對股息收入征稅，使派息相比更加不利支付利息。換言之，現在它會更利于公司的借款并支付利息，而不是分紅。從利息稅扣除收獲傾斜的好處在債務融資支持的平衡，使得利用更具吸引力。</p><p>　　另一個關于1979-1981年稅率環境值得注意的現象是在回應增加派息以非常低的債務水平，公司價值大幅虧損。根據我們的模型，它是一個全公司

49、股權價值可能遇到的損失高達58％（即，VD，Π/V0，0值范圍從1.00至表2A中的第一列0.42）。該公司可以減輕維持較高的債務水平這一損失。稅收制度，使得上述可能討論的不是一個有趣的特點是短期異常僅限于1979-1981年。事實上，兩者的大蕭條和70年代末整個時期的特點是一個類似的稅率環境。我們的模型表明，最優的政策，以最大限度地提高企業在這樣的債務和所需的稅收零零分紅制度的價值。有趣的是此方與當前關注的杠桿政策相一致，當諸如IBM

50、和可口可樂公司在眾多著名的20世紀80年代之前，幾乎沒有，債務杠桿觀察政策。但是，如果一個企業將需要維持高派息率的水平，這將是更好地執行在同一時間相對較高的債務水平了。傳統的電力公司的例子，似乎是符合這個模具。</p><p>　　3、1988-1990年（和1991-1992年）</p><p>　　1988-1990年期間的情況是獨一無二的，因為在這段時間里最普通的收入（從而對股利和利

51、息收入）的邊際稅率名義上與28％的資本利得稅稅率相同。在隨后的2年（1991-1992年），兩稅稅率仍保持十分密切（在31.0％和28.9％）。在公司杠桿價值關系上的股利分紅基本上是沒有緩和影響的趨勢。無論派息水平，從理論上的最大杠桿收益接近50％。我們的預期比較靜態模型，該派息率的影響消失是由于在1988-1992年期間的近零稅率差（τpd？τpg）。</p><p>　　4、1993-2002年</p&

52、gt;<p>　　在1979-81和1988-1992年期間與此相反的逆轉作用下觀察到的稅制，類似的情況，從利用增益總是在1993-2002年的稅收制度中顯陽性。在1993年到1994年以及2002年相關的杠桿關系增益和股利分紅影響的詳細狀況可以看到。從與上一個間隔10年之久的稅收制度的角度來講，杠桿收益對于高派息率公司來說顯得更加明顯和重要。雖然負債水平低或零增長的派息降低公司價值，但是對派息的負面影響減弱了債務水平上升

53、。這種效果是明顯的。</p><p>　　在1988-1992年期間相比，最大限度的利用潛力增益可達50％，在整個20世紀90年代顯著降低稅率變化的最大潛在收益。在1993年，最大的潛在收益接近30％，到1998年，約20％，其余維持這一水平一直到2002年。</p><p>　　對財務杠桿和股利政策對公司價值的綜合影響的性質，多年來79年至02年被發現有廣泛變化作為稅率變化的直接結果。我

54、們討論了上述三種不同的稅收制度，詳細的環境。在第一區間1979-1981，低杠桿和低派息導致較高的公司價值。然而，由于高派息率，該公司正在通過實施更好的高債務水平了。這表明了同步增長的杠桿或減少對企業支出。這是不太可能找到與低杠桿和高派息（這在公司的價值最小可能的結果）公司的。在1979-1981年的時間間隔為模型的實證含義是一個杠桿和支出之間的正相關。</p><p>　　同樣的邏輯也適用于整個1979-198

55、1年之后的幾年時間間隔直到1987年和1992年。1979-1987年期間，稅率在低負債水平上，公司價值增加派息比率下降。同樣，從1993年到2002年，公司將蒙受損失的價值，如果他們選擇增加派息，同時保持較低的負債水平。相比之下，在1988-1992年的時間間隔，較低的負債水平而高股利分紅的公司并沒有受到派息處罰。派息確實無關緊要，在這段時間內不會改變預期，有系統地進行企業間的不同層次的債務。</p><p>

56、　　5、總結和經驗的影響</p><p>　　1979-2002年期間財務杠桿和股利政策對公司價值的綜合影響，被發現是作為一種廣泛的稅率變化的直接結果。我們詳細地討論了上述三種不同的稅收制度環境。在1979-1981年期間，低杠桿和低派息導致較高的公司價值。然而，由于高派息率，該公司正在通過實施更好的高債務水平了。這表明了在杠桿效應和企業支出上同步的增長或減少。這是不太可能找到低杠桿和高派息（導致公司價值值最小的

57、結果）的公司。在1979-1981年的時間間隔為模型的實證含義是一個杠桿和支出之間的正相關。</p><p>　　在1988-1992年期間支付的股息和資本結構的相互作用，我們的模型所隱含的故障提供了一個機會來檢驗模型的實證。如果我們的模型在浮動稅率環境下能作為股利分紅和資本結構互動的一個合理代表的話，</p><p>　　我們將期待在1979-1987年和1993-2002年期間的股利分

58、紅和債務水平將呈現正相關。在1988-1992年期間，派息與杠桿效應間的聯系預計將減弱。我們在第5節進行實證檢驗，研究這些預測的有效性。值得一提的是，企業的范圍內，隨著時間的推移已經從向股東分配股利轉移到股票的回購，我們的實證分析，只使用派息數據，將不能夠延續這一趨勢。事實上，相對于派息而言，在所研究的三十年有一個公司更加傾向于股票回購。由于數據的限制，我們不追求股票回購的實證研究。但是，請注意，本文得出的模型是通過捕捉隱含的資本利得的

59、長期回購的估值效應。</p><p>　　這篇文章我們完善了相對公司在不同稅率股利分配和資本增長下聯系資本結構與股利支付政策的股價模型。因此它是擴展的原來的米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)的股利政策模型及米勒 (1977年)模型。我們用數值和圖形證明這個自1979年以來的新模型含義在實際10種不同的稅收制度,派生出該模型內涵對于企業價值根據股利支付率和負債比率的計算。</p><p>　　我們

60、的分析表明大范圍的公司價值計算依靠當時特定設立的稅率。在第一個區間,1979-1981,當時稅收制度上的一個特點在股利收入高稅率相比與企業所得稅和個人資本所得, 如果派利支付是相對較小,增加財政杠桿會導致企業價值損失。在股利支付率低于40%，企業價值的損失作為對響應增加負債比率可能達到23%。在同一時期,如果公司保持著股利支付率超過40%,如果一個股份公司決定擔負債務,公司價值可以將近一半。在1988 - 1990時期,當稅率在股利收入

61、和資本收益上都是28%,一個獨資股權公司（沒有關于它的股利支付水平）可能提高價值通過差不多2倍的負債。在1998年之后盛行的稅收制度,最大限度的潛在獲利通過不支付股利股權公司大約20%,然而一個高股利支付率公司可能價值漲一倍如果增加其債務融資。</p><p>　　在不同的稅收制度利用股價分析模式,我們建立幾個預言來實證。實證檢驗結果強烈支持我們分析的基本預測在一個靜態環境。摘要在股利政策和財務杠桿決策之間的相互

62、作用顯著影響通過現行稅率。更多模型的動態預測在后來實驗中保持。</p><p>　　從構想來說，稅務基礎模式是從早期的銀行破產，金融危機成本，機構分析，和相關理論中反映出來的。然而，其延伸出的稅務基礎模式可以通過其研究和政策規模合理的了解公司金融政策。公司資本結構中已經存在的債務水平在其權衡交易定論里面得到一個合理的建立。合理的債務性融資可以對該公司起到一個正面的影響力。概括這些，我們所提及的模式可以潛在性為資本

63、結構中所涉及到的股息配股方面提供一個有價值的結果。</p><p>　　在不久的將來，關于美國現有稅務環境的變化都是可能的，特別是如果美國現有公民關于其工作，稅收增長中進行的減免政策是被允許使用到國會到期。這章中涉及到現有模式的優點是可以更方便融入邊際稅率中所關于收入這一塊，它可以更有效的去讓一個公司的決策者更好的去分析公司的股權和債務。研究調查的目的是希望能從過去的三十年相關的政策中獲得有效的改變。</p