外文翻譯---公司治理與會計信息失真

1、<p><b>　　中文3464字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業論文（設計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 </p><p>　　專 業

2、 會 計 學 </p><p>　　外文題目 The Corporate Governance and the </p><p>　　Distorted Accounting Information </p><p>　　外文出處 Asian Social Science. July20

3、08, Vol. 4, No. 7 </p><p>　　外文作者 Qiufei Wang </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The Corporate Governance and the Distorted Accounting Inform

4、ation</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Distorted accounting information of the public company becomes the main element restricting our country’s economic development. Hence, how to

5、improve accounting information quality becomes a hot topic. This study in brief analyzes some factors, which affect accounting information quality from the direction of corporate governance. Moreover it gives out several

6、 different mathematical models and proposes a base train of administering thought, in order to establish a few foundations for research on</p><p>　　Keywords: Corporate governance, The Distorted accounting in

7、formation</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　The distorted accounting information is the “Chronic illness” of securities markets. Because it endangers government Marco-control, disturbs tax reven

8、ue and does harm to functioning of optimizing capital resource disposal, many governments attempt to resole this problem. Yet even to this day, varieties of events about distorted accounting information still disturb the

9、 whole world. For example “Enron” in United States, and “Ying guangxia” and “lantian” in China. This study concludes that the reas</p><p>　　Corporate governance is an arrangement of law, culture, usual pract

10、ice and systems, which are use for harmonizing and controlling the relationship and action between every participant. So the most fundamental problem, which will be resolved, is the action of the agent problem. For this

11、reason, it is emergence to benefit conflict between “principal” and “agent” and asymmetric information. All of those evoke distorted accounting information. Reports published by COSO, on the basis of the research,</p&

12、gt;<p>　　Figue 1. Financial Affairs Malpractices Corporation</p><p>　　In view of the above, we think the reason that induces the distorted accounting information is defects in corporate governance pat

13、terns. Because of those defects, some mechanisms cannot supervise and penalize the action. So accounting information cannot be creditable. This study in brief analyzes some factors, which affect accounting information qu

14、ality from the direction of corporate governance. Moreover it gives out several different instances that directly cause accounting information distort</p><p>　　2. Ownership structure and distorted accounting

15、 information</p><p>　　Generally speaking, ownership structure contains two implications: firstly, varied percent possessed by different stockholders; secondly, owner ship structure concentration degree. It i

16、s the significant component and the ownership base of corporate governance. Rational ownership structure decides if the basis function by which corporate governance ensures the credible financial report can work well. St

17、ockholders as owners of capital have to make contacts with managers according to the accounting</p><p>　　Through the ownership structure research on the public company with financial report malpractice actio

18、ns, we discover that there are two distinguishing feature in those companies: first the proportion of circulative stock is to low, and second the first stockholder are nation and “ legal person”, with the highest proport

19、ion being 51%(Figure 2). In Japan banks are the most important stockholders, with centralized ownership structure being only possess 15% ( Figure 3).Government and manager depart</p><p>　　Figure 2 . Corporat

20、e identity</p><p>　　Figure 3 . Ownership Structures in Japan</p><p>　　3. Improper incentive mechanisms is the direct cause that creates the distorted accounting information</p><p>　

21、　The problem of incentive mechanism is very significant in corporate governance. Because ownership and managerial authority are separate in modern company.</p><p>　　The interest of the stockholder and the ma

22、nagerial authority has diverged. For this reason, owners design incentive mechanism to make the action of managerial authority agree with stockholder’s benefit. In the U.S. the incentive mechanism of the public company w

23、as most obvious. By the end of 2001, 90%of the great business of the U.S. sent non-qualified stock options to managers, 60% of the revenue of managers came from stock. Yet incentive mechanism is “two blade swords”. On on

24、e hang it makes ma</p><p>　　Swindles which happened in the U.S. confirm that the action of giving excessive motivation to inspire managers just like “drinking poison to quench thirst”. The benefits of manage

25、rs should not be combined together with company benefit. This is the cause of the distorted accounting information. To some degree, non-qualified stock options are the main reason of the American accounting swindles law

26、cases. We consider that improper incentive mechanism is the direct cause that creates the distorted a</p><p>　　Nowadays, the revenue form in China is comparatively simple (Tab 1). Monthly pay and bonus are t

27、he most common form that the companies adopt. There is an intimate relationship between bonus and accounting benefit, so in the case of insider control, use bonus as incentive means usually leads the publish distorted ac

28、counting information to control benefit. </p><p>　　On the other hand, the traditional viewpoint of Chinese is “The government official is most important”. Some managers’ goal is to become an official or poli

29、tician, so for those people accounting becomes a chess piece. It is not strange for a company to appear to “turn hostile suddenly”. Though analysis of those financial malpractice cases, we may discover that the improper

30、incentive mechanism impels managers to control the profit, thereby cause the distorted accounting information.</p><p>　　Table 1. Corporation administration person year revenue together revenue shape</p>

31、;<p>　　4. The unqualified supervisory mechanism is the external cause that creates the distorted accounting information</p><p>　　The supervisory mechanism of public company consists of exterior superv

32、ision and interior supervision. Exterior supervision means the company restricts the managers’ action through outside marketplace. These marketplaces chiefly are the product marketplace, the manager marketplace, and the

33、capital marketplace. Interior supervision means that companies restrict the managers’ action through specific system design. Exterior supervision will take a long time to be established, and tradition, culture</p>

34、<p>　　The act also has stiffened penalties for corporate and criminal fraud by company insiders. The law makes it a crime to destroy, alter or falsify records in a federal investigation or if a company declares ban

35、kruptcy. The penalty for those found guilty includes fines, or up to 20 years imprisonment, or both.</p><p>　　No personal loans or extensions of credit to company executives either directly or though a subsi

36、diary, except for certain extension of credit under an open –ended credit plan or charge card, home improvement and manufactured home loans, or extensions of credit plan by a broker or dealer to its employee to buy, trad

37、e or carry securities.</p><p>　　Any CEO or CFO who “recklessly” violates his or her certification of the company financial statement. If “willfully” violates, fine of up to $1,000,000 and /or up to 10 years

38、imprisonment. Fine of up to $5 million and /up to 20 years imprisonment.</p><p>　　The act vests the audit committee of a publicly traded company with responsibility for the appointment, compensation and over

39、sight of any registered public accounting information to perform audit services.</p><p>　　The supervisory mechanism of the public company in China consists of stockholder board, corporate board and superviso

40、r board. But those boards cannot supervise the manager efficiently. When the outstanding achievement is not very good, certainly the manager will utilize different measures and announce the distorted accounting informati

41、on to attain individual and political aims.</p><p>　　5. Pattern of the relationship between the corporate governance and the distorted accounting information and some proposals</p><p>　　Accounti

42、ng information is orient to advance efficiency and improve performance of company though using the mechanism to control the accountant datum. If this corporate mechanism brings into play efficiently, the accounting infor

43、mation must combine well with capital market. Because the price of stock can identify effort of manager and the possibility of controlling the surplus, the accounting index may sieve the unconventional influence of non-e

44、conomic factors. The other way round, the corporate </p><p>　　The relationship can be described by Figure 4.</p><p>　　Figue 4 . Relationship of Accounting Information and the Corporate Governanc

45、e</p><p>　　After the accounting information is announced by the manager, through the stockholder board\ the corporate board and the supervisor board, it finally becomes the public record. By means of the ana

46、lysis of the foregoing paragraphs, we think the main elements affecting quality accounting information are the ownership structure, the supervisory mechanism and the incentive mechanism. According to the formula below, t

47、he real accounting information is measured to A, the improperly ownership structure,</p><p>　　Y = A[1-α][1-β][1-γ] （1）</p><p>　?。?≤α≤1,0≤β≤1,0≤λ≤1, j

48、ustγ≤α,β）</p><p>　　To be fit for Chinese the conditions; solving problem of the distorted accounting information involves changing ownership structure, and establishing incentive mechanism. Moreover this pro

49、cess involves improving the setup of interior and exterior supervisory mechanism.</p><p>　　The following steps may be taken in the process:</p><p>　　Reducing the proportion of the national stock

50、 and personal stock in the specified situation, and then adding to the proportion of circulation stock.</p><p>　　Improving the essential system makes the valid demand accounting information a priority.</p

51、><p>　　Improving the standard achievement evaluation target and the personal payment system, relieving the need to announce the distorted accounting information.</p><p>　　Establishing more kinds of

52、 incentive mechanism.</p><p>　　Speeding up product market, director man and capital market establishment.</p><p>　　Establishing improved stockholder statute for their protection.</p><

53、p>　　Establishing the independent audit commission, with strange built-in control.</p><p>　　Improving the supervisor board system.</p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　The distorted a

54、ccounting information possesses two general direction financial report malpractice and profit control. The scope of the study is restricted to the relationship between the financial report malpractice and corporate gover

55、nance. As to the corporate government, the study only carries on preliminary research through three main respects. The study proposes the easy mathematical model of the accounting information quality. That the relationsh

56、ip between the supervisory of the exterior, s</p><p>　　Source: Asian Social Science. 2008,7 (4)：69-73.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　公司治理與會計信息失真</p><p>　　摘要：

57、制約我國經濟的發展的主要因素是上市公司會計信息失真。因此,如何提高會計信息質量成為熱門話題。本研究簡要分析了影響因素、會計信息質量公司治理的方向，而且提出了幾種不同的數學模型，提出了一種基本思路, 目的是建立一個研究一些基礎會計信息失真問題。</p><p>　　關鍵字：公司治理 會計信息失真</p><p><b>　　1. 引言</b></p>&l

58、t;p>　　被扭曲的會計信息是“慢性疾病”的證券市場。因為它危及政府宏觀調控，擾亂稅收和有害于運轉的優化資本資源處理,許多政府試圖解決這個問題。然而，即使到今天，關于會計信息失真的事件仍擾亂了整個世界。例如美國的“安然”,而“銀廣夏”和“藍天”在中國。該研究報告的結論是：研究的是會計信息失真的治理不能獲得突破是它忽視了這個問題的根源。委托代理關系導致會計信息失真, 所以只能在會計準則和會計制度而定的方法是不是最有效的方法來解決問題

59、。</p><p>　　公司治理是法律、文化、慣例和制度，這是協調和控制之間的關系和每一位參與者行動中使用的安排。所以最根本的問題將得到解決，是代理的問題采取行動?；谶@個原因，它是有利于出現“主體”、“代理人”和信息之間不對稱的沖突，這些都引起會計信息失真。COSO的出版研究涉及200個財務報告舞弊2003年至1007年上市公司的基礎，報告顯示：72％的案件涉及的CEO中，43％都與財務總監，25％的人對公司沒

60、有設立審計委員會。這項研究的研究樣本包括50個1994至2000年上市公司財務舞弊，根據證監會的處罰，在那些關系到董事及經理79％的案件，表明有79％的案件涉及到會計信息失真。（圖1）</p><p>　　圖1：財務公司營私舞弊的</p><p>　　基于上述觀點，我們認為引起會計信息失真的原因是公司治理模式的缺陷。由于這些缺陷，一些機制不能監督和懲罰的行動。</p><

61、;p>　　因此，會計信息不能扣抵。本研究簡要分析了影響因素，會計信息質量公司治理的方向。此外，它給出了幾種不同的情況直接會導致會計信息失真。在此基礎上,研究設計了一種數學模型的設計思路，提出一種基礎管理思想,以建立研究會計信息失真問題的一些基礎訓練。</p><p>　　2. 所有制結構和會計信息失真</p><p>　　一般來說，所有制結構包含兩種意義:首先，由不同的股東擁有百分之

62、多樣；其次，業主船體結構集中程度，這是一個重要組成部分與公司治理股權基地。在合理的所有制結構決定功能的基礎上，其中的企業管治確保能提供可信的財務報告工作。股東作為主人資本與經理根據企業會計信息聯系，實現最大的資本利潤。因此股東是會計信息的檢查，但是股東有明確的比例，有不同的要求。</p><p>　　我們認為大股東是會計信息主體。在這一主體中，經濟利益之間的關系和會計信息比別人更重要，所以他們擁有更多的權力來管理

63、和控制會計信息質量。例如，首先發現“安然”案的是在投資機構的財務分析師。合理的所有制結構產生會計信息需求者與會計信息失真會減小。</p><p>　　通過對與財務報告舞弊行為的上市公司股權結構的研究，我們發現有兩個顯著特征的公司：首先，流通股比例低，其次是國家股東和“法人”，最高比例是51％（圖2）。在日本銀行最重要的股東與股權集中僅擁有15％（圖3）結構。</p><p>　　政府和經理

64、部門,作為國家股票的股東及業主，產權不能夠提出剩余時間,所以它是沒有足夠的動力監督和評價他們。所以在中國“內部人控制”已成為一個重要的問題。因此，“內部人控制”成為中國的一個重要問題。為了實現控制，內幕必須使用會計信息失真。因此，這成為不正當所有制的會計信息失真的來源。</p><p><b>　　圖2：公司特征</b></p><p>　　圖3：在日本的股權結構&l

65、t;/p><p>　　3. 不適當的激勵機制是創建的直接原因是會計信息失真</p><p>　　激勵機制的問題是很重要的意義,在公司治理結構。因為所有權和經營權分離是現代公司。</p><p>　　股東的利益和管理當局已經偏離。因此, 管理機關同意股東的利益，業主設計激勵機制來完成動作。在美國，公眾公司的激勵機制最為明顯。到2001年底，90％美國偉大的企業派出非限定股

66、票期權的經理，管理人員60％的收入來自于股票。然而激勵機制是“兩刃刀”，在一個方面它促使管理人員的工作效率，但另一方面，它促使管理人員提供會計信息失真。</p><p>　　騙取這在美國發生的事情證實，確認給予過多的動機采取行動，激勵經理人就像“喝毒藥解渴”。管理者的利益不應該與公司利益相結合，這是會計信息失真的原因。在某種程度上，非合格股票期權是美國會計欺詐違法案件的主要原因。</p><p

67、>　　我們認為，不適當的激勵機制創建的直接原因是會計信息失真。美國會計欺詐的法律案例起源來自賠償，但對在中國上市公司會計信息失真僅僅是至關重要的短期的激勵機制。</p><p>　　如今，中國的收入形式是比較簡單的（表1）。該公司采用的每月工資和獎金是最常見的形式。獎金和會計之間的親密關系，使受益的內部人控制的情況下，用紅利作為獎勵手段通常會導致會計信息失真的發布控制受益。</p><p

68、>　　另一方面，中國傳統的觀點是：“政府官員是最重要的”。一些管理者的目標是成為一個官方或政客，所以對于這些人會計成為棋子。公司出現的“翻臉”是不奇怪的。通過這些財務舞弊案件的分析，我們可以發現，不當的激勵機制促使管理人員來控制利潤，從而導致會計信息失真。</p><p>　　表1. 公司管理人員年收入（收入形式）</p><p>　　4. 外因是不合格的監督機制，創造了會計信息失真

69、</p><p>　　上市公司監督機制包括外部監督和內部監督。外部監督是指公司限制了經理人通過外部市場的行動。這些市場主要是產品市場、經理市場、資本市場。內部監督的手段，通過具體制度設計，制約企業管理者的行動。</p><p>　　外部監督需要很長的時間才能建立，傳統、文化、政治環境將有很大的影響。因此，它是為外部監督，解決會計信息失真需要很長一段時間，不能快速完成它。在這種情況下，盡快解

70、決問題將取決于內部監督。</p><p>　　美國的辦法是值得研究的。在經歷了一系列會計丑聞的情況下，美國政府通過薩班斯——奧克斯利2002年行動，解決會計信息質量。該法有幾個方面，如下：</p><p>　?。?）該企業行為也有助于對公司內部欺詐的刑事處罰。該法使犯罪毀滅，篡改或偽造在聯邦調查記錄，或者如果一個公司宣布破產。對于那些被判有罪的刑罰包括罰款，最多20年監禁，或兩者兼而有之。

71、</p><p>　?。?）任何個人貸款或直接授信公司高管或子公司，除了一定的信用擴展下一個不限成員名額信貸計劃或簽賬卡，家居裝修及住房貸款，由經紀人或經銷商的雇員購買，進行證券交易或信貸計劃的擴展。</p><p>　?。?）任何行政總裁或首席財務官“魯莽”違反其對公司財務報表的證明。如果“蓄意”違反，罰款高達100萬元及（或）最多10年監禁，罰款高達500萬元及最多20年監禁。<

72、/p><p>　?。?）該行為為一個任命責任與上市公司的審計委員會，補償任何注冊會計師執行審計監督，以信息服務。</p><p>　　該公司在中國的公眾監督機制有股東董事會、公司董事會和監事會。但是，這些議會不能有效地監督經理。當成績不是很好時，管理者就利用不同的措施公布會計信息失真以實現個人和政治目的。</p><p>　　5.公司治理和會計信息失真之間的關系模式，提

73、出一些建議</p><p>　　會計信息是東方推進效率，改善使用的機制來控制會計公司業績的數據。如果會計信息必須與資本市場結合起來，這個企業的機制發揮作用，帶來了高效。由于股票價格可以識別經理的努力和控制過剩的可能性，可篩的會計指標的非經濟因素產生非傳統的影響。反過來，公司治理能促進經理報告真實的會計信息。這種關系可以說是圖4。</p><p>　　圖4. 會計信息的關系及企業管治<

74、/p><p>　　公布的會計信息是管理者通過股東板\公司董事會和監事會，它之后終于成為公共記錄。通過對上述段落的分析手段，我們認為，影響會計信息質量的主要因素是股權結構，監督機制和激勵機制。</p><p>　　根據下面的公式，真正的會計信息衡量為A，在所有制結構不當，監督機制和激勵機制影響會計信息質量等級為α，β，γ，可信的會計信息是Y：</p><p>　　Y =

75、A[1-α][1-β][1-γ] （1）</p><p>　?。?≤α≤1,0≤β≤1,0≤λ≤1, 只是γ≤α,β）</p><p>　　適合中國條件，解決會計信息失真的問題包括改變股權結構、建立激勵機制。而且這種過程包括建立內部和外部監督機制?？梢圆扇∫韵虏襟E：</p><p>　　

76、（1）在指定的情況下減少國家和個人持股比例，然后加入到流通股比例。</p><p>　?。?）提高基本制度，是會計信息的有效需求的一個優先事項。</p><p>　?。?）提高業績評價指標和個人繳費制度的標準，減少需要公布的失真的會計信息。</p><p>　?。?）建立更多種類的激勵機制。</p><p>　?。?）加快產品市場、總監與資本

77、市場的建立。</p><p>　?。?）建立改進的股東保護條例。</p><p>　?。?）建立獨立的審計委員會,特別的內部控制。</p><p>　?。?）完善監事會制度。</p><p><b>　　6. 結論</b></p><p>　　會計信息失真具有兩個大方向：財務報告舞弊和利潤控制。這