對可操控資產計提減值的審視外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2845字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業論文（設計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文出處 Accounting Horizons </p><p>　　Sep92，vol6，issue3，

2、p30-41 </p><p>　　外文作者 Linda j.Zucca and David R.Campbell 原文：</p><p>　　A Closer Look at Discretionary Writedowns of Impaired Asset</p><p>　　The Current Envirome

3、nt</p><p>　　An asset is said to be "impaired" when its book value exceeds some measure of its "fair" value. When a firm recognizes this impairment and subsequently records the effect by d

4、ecreasing the book value of the asset and debiting an income statement account, the firm has recorded a "writedown." GAAP clearly allows these writedowns in several situations. First, certain current assets, su

5、ch as marketable securities and inventories, are examined periodically and adjusted to the lower of cost or market.</p><p>　　Timing and Motivation</p><p>　　At the current time, partial writedown

6、s of impaired long-lived assets are recognized at the discretion of management (and with the subsequent support of their auditors). Thus, it is important to investigate when management decides that the impairment should

7、he recorded and what might motivate them to make such a dedsion. It is very difficult to assess the factors which might motivate a manager to record any discretionary event because of the manager's inahility or retic

8、ence to describe the dedsi</p><p>　　of and motivation for discretionary writedowns.</p><p>　　By observing reported earnings surrounding the period in which the writedown was announced, two possi

9、hle patterns of earnings management can be identified: income smoothing and 'l)ig baths." Income smoothing describes sm earnings pattern in which management aspires to maintain a steady and predictable rate of e

10、arnings growth. Management may try to record discretionary gains, losses, or accruals in the period which will best help them to attain their goal of steady growth. This goal may he percei</p><p>　　A second

11、form of earnings management has been referred to as the "big bath." Under this scenario, the firm appears to "save up" discretionary losses or accruals and then record several in the same period or in

12、 a period in which the firm has already experienced below normal earnings. Management might undertake a "big bath" to signal investors that "bad times" are behind them and hetter times will follow. In

13、 the case of discretionary asset writedowns, this reasoning is particularly appropriate sin</p><p>　　Financial Consequences of Discretionary Writedowns</p><p>　　The financial consequences of rec

14、ording discretionary writedowns of impaired assets can be assessed by observing certain finandal indicators at the time of and after the writedown. Three specific indicators have been chosen in this study: (1) the reacti

15、on of the stock market, (2) the frequency of subsequent merger or acquisition activity, and (3) the subsequent financial health of the firms as measured by certain key ratios. Each of these three indicators will be discu

16、ssed separately.</p><p>　　Stock Market Reaction. The average stock returns of the writedown firms (adjusted for cash and stock dividends as well as firm-spedfic risk) were compared with the market return for

17、 a period of sixty days before to sixty days after the announcement of the writedown. On the average, there were no significant unusual or excess returns earned by the writedown firms over this period of time.In addition

18、, they performed similarly to a control group of firms matched on the basis of industry and asset s</p><p>　　These results do not refute the anecdotal evidence that firms announcing discretionary price incre

19、ases. Rather, they indicate that for every firm that achieves these positive results, there is a firm for which the market acts negatively.Thus, a firm which records a writedown is just as likely to experience a negative

20、 market reaction as it is a positive market reaction.</p><p>　　Subsequent Merger or Acquisition Activity. Some people in the business and academic communities believe that a writedown may be an indicator of

21、some sort of major capital structure change such as an acquisition of,acquisition by, or a merger with another similarly sized organization. To investigate this contention, each writedown firm was observed £rom the

22、writedown date through the end of 1987 for evidence of merger or acquisition activity, and the results were compared with those of firms in s</p><p>　　The results indicate that a greater number of the writed

23、own firms engage in subsequent mergers or acquisitions than do firms in similar industries and of similar size which do not record writedowns. However, a chisquared test found that the frequency of subsequent merger or a

24、cquisition activity is not significantly higher (at a 0.05 level of significance) for the writedown firms. This means that the apparent differences could be due to chance. There is no statistical evidence to support the

25、cont</p><p>　　Subsequent Financial Health. To evaluate the comparative financial health of the writedown and control firms in the periods surrounding the writedown, four financial variables, (1) Cash Dividen

26、d Growth, (2) Earnings/Price Ratio, (3) Debt to Equity Ratio, and (4) Quarterly Return on Assets, were measured at six points in time over the period of three years before to three years a|ter the writedown. The period i

27、n which the writedown was recorded is not included because of its obvious impact on the</p><p>　　writedowns.</p><p>　　The results of these calculations and variables are presented in Figure 4. T

28、he significance of the difference in the means of the three groups (large writedowns, small writedowns, and control) at each point in time and for each variable is evaluated using a oneway analysis of variance design.<

29、;/p><p>　　Summary and Conclusions</p><p>　　There are several conclusions that can be drawn firom the results of these empirical tests of discretionary writedowns of impaired assets. First, the numb

30、er of events located dxiring the test period of 1981 to 1983 is low. This observation may indicate two different situations. First, asset impairments not already covered by GAAP could be infrequent. Second, and probably

31、more realistic, the number of partial impairments may be significant, but, given the paucity of specific regulatory guidance o</p><p>　　Second, the writedowns occur primarily in the fourth quarter of the fis

32、cal year, probably because of the more extensive review due to the budgeting and audit processes occurring in that period. Management tends to view the writedowns as unusual events and highlights them as separate line it

33、ems after income from operations. However, even in a period preceding the SEC's prohibition of extraordinary income statement treatment, none of the firms disclosed the writedown after continuing operations.</p>

34、;<p>　　Third, the majority of the firms wrote down their assets in a period of already below normal earings (a "big bath"), but 25 percent offset the writedown with other gains or unusually high earnings

35、 (income smoothing).These results provide support for the contention that writedowns are being used to manage earnings. Finally, the writedowns are not a precursor of improved financial health for the firm. No significan

36、t evidence of positive stock market reaction to the writedown announcement</p><p>　　could be foiind. There is no significant increase in merger or acquisition activity for writedown firms as compared to a co

37、ntrol group of firms. In general, control firms outperformed writedown firms on the basis of key financial characteristics. In addition, the larger the writedown as a percentage of assets, the larger the decline in finan

38、cial health.</p><p>　　For those firms which did decide to record partial writedowns despite the lack of specific regulatory requirements, this study indicates a less than positive picture. Recording the writ

39、edown as a fourth quarter adjustment without "warning" evidence of earnings management,and finally declining financial health which intensifies as the relative size of the writedown increases are all contradict

40、ory to the impression often given by the financial press, and perhaps management itself, that the writedo</p><p>　　Source: Zucca,Linda J,David R.Campbell.A closer look at discretionary writedowns of impaired

41、 assets[J].Accounting Horizons,1992(3):30－41.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　對可操控資產計提減值的審視</p><p><b>　　當前環境</b></p><p>　　當一項資產的賬面價值超過其公允價值的時候。這項資產

42、被認為是“減值的”。一個公司確認資產價值的減損，隨后記錄由減少資產的賬面價值和借記損益表賬戶而帶來的影響時，這個公司就記錄了“資產減值”。一般的公認會計準則清楚地認同這幾種情況下的減記。首先，一定的流動資產，如有價證券、存貨，都被定期進行檢查，調整為較低的成本或者市價。同樣，長期股權投資的價值也定期地調整，以成本與市價孰低計量，盡管利潤表沒有受到影響。最后，任何擬出售的長期資產(包括資產作為停止經營而被出售的一個組成部分)也被調整為可變

43、現凈值。一個公司進行的資產減記大部分都屬于以上這三種類別。</p><p><b>　　時機和動機</b></p><p>　　目前，部分受損的壽命較長的資產價值的減記被認為是在管理層決策（和他們的審計人員的支持）的結果。因此，研究管理層作出決策記錄資產減值的時間和動機是十分重要的。由于管理層的無能和對于決策過程的沉默，我們很難評估是什么促使管理層記錄資產減值。通常研

44、究者可以從得到的數據中得出結論來提供明顯的驅動因素。在本文中，盈余管理將被認為企業決策資產減值的一種可能的解釋。</p><p>　　通過觀察，存在兩種盈余管理的可能模式：1.收益平滑。2.大清洗。收益平滑是這樣一種盈利模式：管理層渴望保持一種穩定的可預測的盈利增長速率。管理層可能嘗試記錄一些可以支配的收益和虧損，在此期間，盡量幫助他們實現增長穩定的目標。這個目標被視為是可取的，因為管理模式的激勵結構，以平滑盈余

45、獎勵計劃，或者這樣一種希望：市場把收益平滑視為一種降低風險和隨之帶來的較高收益的股票的一種手段。因此，在資產價值減記的情況下，一個有減值資產公司可能會試圖記錄在一個時期高于正常收入的損失，也可能控制損失的時間，以配合可支配收益（例如，贏得了大量的訴訟及和解）。盈余管理的第二種形式被稱為“大清洗?！痹谶@種情況下，公司出現大量計提資產減值的，公司在改期的收益低于正常收益，管理層更有可能進行“大清洗”，目的在于提示投資者說：“困難時期”的背后

46、他們美好的時間將隨之而來。在可以控制的資產計提</p><p>　　減值準備的情況下，這個理由是合適的，因為資產價值的減計在以后期間可以降低折舊費用?！按笄逑础北徽J為是一種進行資產價值減計的可能動機。確定盈余管理是否在本研究中是適時減計資產價值的可能動機：收益平滑被認為是在計提資產減值之前的收入要高于計提之后的收入。通過計提資產減值，報告收益比較接近（但不低于）預期的水平。而“大清洗”的特點是計提資產減值之前的收

47、入低于預期的業績，因此，公司記錄了一些其他損失，在該會計期間內，收益遠遠低于預期。</p><p>　　計提資產減值的經濟后果</p><p>　　通過觀察計提資產減值中或之后的經濟指標來評估價值毀損資產的計提資產減值記錄的結果。此次研究有三個指標：股票市場對此的反映，并購的頻率，以及通過主要比率來衡量公司財政的健康度。其中每一個指標都得分開討論。</p><p>

48、　　股票市場對此的反映。在披露計提資產減值之后的減記公司平均股價的回升（調整后的現金股利、股票股利和公司特定的風險）帶來的市場回報與減計之前60天的平均股價相比較。平均而言，在這段時間內，減記公司并沒有其他主要的或是多余的報酬。他們就像公司的控制組一樣在同一時間控制著工業和資產的規模。</p><p>　　這些結果并不違背公司的價格自由上漲的實例的證據。相反，這表明市場一定會對一些公司產生消極影響。 因此，公司的

49、減記記錄就像是經歷一個與消極的市場一樣的積極市場反應。</p><p>　　隨后的并購活動。一些經商的和學術領域的人士認為減記意味著主要資金結構的變化，例如收購，或是與同等規模的公司兼并。為了調查這一論點，每個減記公司都要從減記日起，以1987年末開始的并購為依據，與同規模的公司相比較，結果如表2，表明大量的減記公司從事并購。 然而，測試檢測并購的頻率并非大大高于減記公司（只多出0.05個等級）。這意味著一個偶然

50、可能導致明顯的不同。并沒有數據支持被損害資產的自由減記如同公司的并購。</p><p>　　隨之而來的財務狀況。要想評估減記的相對財務狀況，并且在減記階段管理公司，我們選取四了個金融變量進行測定，以六個百分點為取點，以減記的三年前和三年后為時間段，而這四個金融變量分別是（1）現金分紅增長率（2）收入/性價比（3）債務產權率（4）資產收益率。由于對金融變量的顯著影響以及對</p><p>　

51、　每個變量闡明了長遠上更加明晰的發展趨勢，這段記錄在案的減記時期并未算作在內。另外，由于減記項目的種類變化較多，減記公司會基于減記總額占公司資產總額的百分比來分成兩組。以這種方式進行的分組，將有利于觀察在隨后一階段，減記規模對公司財務狀況的影響。而這兩組也將會被稱為大減記和小減記。</p><p>　　這些運算及變量的結果將會在數據4中呈現出來。在此期間，這三組數據（大減記，小減記，控制）不同之處的重要性，將在每

52、個百分點的特定時間，通過方差分析的方法評估出來。</p><p><b>　　概括與總結</b></p><p>　　對于有損資產的自由減記的統計檢驗，得出以下結論：</p><p>　　第一，1981至1983年的事件發生的率很低。此種結果表明兩種情形：其一，有損資產在一般會計準則中不常出現；其二，更現實的說，局部受損的數目占主要，但是少數特

53、別的規則要求，減記不被記錄。此種情形為社區的標準設定做了暗示，因為它對潛在規則的評估帶來了困難。公司的記錄減記趨向于資本密集型，并將在紐約證券交易所進行交易。減記也有絕對和相對之分，可能反映所包含的受損資產。</p><p>　　第二，這些記錄主要是記錄本年第四季度的財政狀況的，也許是因為預算和審計等過程都在那個時間段，所以進行吸引了更加廣泛的注意。管理層傾向于將這些記錄視作對不尋常事物的記錄，強調將它們當作獨立

54、的，反映公司收入的曲線指標。但是，甚至在證券委員會頒布對特別的所得計算書待遇的禁令之前，沒有任何一家公司在繼續業務運行之后，公布了這些記錄。</p><p>　　第三，大多數公司記錄下它們的財產總值時，其利潤已經低于正常時的收益了（一個大水缸）。但是，通過其他收入或者是不同尋常的高利潤（收入波動）補償了記錄所表明的25%的財產。這些理由為記錄被用于管理利潤這一議題提供了有利的支持。</p><

55、p>　　最后，這些記錄不是公司改良財政狀況的前兆。尚未發現確切的證據表明股票市場和記錄之間有確定的聯系。通過同一些集團化的公司做對比，通過合并或提升公司能夠使得這些記錄的數據獲得顯著增加。</p><p>　　總而言之，支配性的公司在一些基關鍵性的關于財政基礎方面的特征要優于記錄公司。而且，關于財產部分所做的記錄越多，公司其財政健康度也更加傾向</p><p><b>　　

56、于不良。</b></p><p>　　對于那些即使缺乏特殊的規章條件但依然確實決定記錄部分資產減值的公司，這項研究表明其結果并非是有利的。缺乏盈余管理的警告的證據而將這些計提的減值作為第四季度的調整記錄下來，最終導致的與計提資產減值相關的財政健康程度的下降都與記錄可以產生良好效果的映像是相矛盾的，作為政策制定者而言，它提供了一個進退兩難的困境，那就是到底有多少公司實際上有不良資產，但是迄今為止，并未記