股權結構與公司業績[外文翻譯]

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel </p><p>　　Material Source: Journal of Management and Governance </p><p>　

2、　Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky </p><p>　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　For many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprieto

3、rships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the

4、firm and shares its profits.</p><p>　　However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corpora

5、tion has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is

6、 disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.</p><p>　　The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relieves financing problems, which e

7、nables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they (the professional m

8、angers) do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money (sell common stocks) in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional m</p><p>　　Moderating

9、factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chan

10、ce that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the

11、 modern corporation, and it troubled many economi</p><p>　　Agency-type problems exist also in closely held firms because there are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between

12、 the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.</p><p>　　The presence of agency problems weakens the central t

13、hesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases th

14、e advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, w

15、e maint</p><p>　　2. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance</p><p>　　One of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporati

16、ons are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.</p><p>　　There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and

17、control. Early theorists such as Williamson (1964) propose that non-owner managers prefer their own interests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed

18、firms.</p><p>　　The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fam

19、a (1980), for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board

20、constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy (1985), suggest that executive compen</p><p>　　The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed (see Short (1994) for a summary). Part of the diverse results

21、can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholde

22、rs, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), the rela</p><p>　　In this study, we utilize

23、 the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach (1997). This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms control

24、led by a group of individuals (partners). Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emer

25、ge.</p><p><b>　　3. Data</b></p><p>　　We employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies tra

26、ded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992–1994 net income (profits after tax), 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownershi

27、p structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their owner</p><p>　　The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE (abou

28、t 560 at the time). However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1) according to the Israeli Security Authority (the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC) only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2) 147 co

29、mpanies have a negative 1992–94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3) for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.</p><p>　　The companies in the

30、 sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals (family firms or partnerships of ind

31、ividuals) own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half (49%) of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest (51%) are dominated by families. Professional (n

32、on-owner) CEOs are found in about 15% of</p><p>　　4. Methodology: Data Envelopment Analysis</p><p>　　In this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Data En

33、velopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations (see Seiford and Thrall, 1990), and previous versions of it have been used in Finance (by Elyasiani andMehdian, 199

34、2, for example).</p><p>　　The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a por

35、tfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and asses

36、ses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy</p><p>　　The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investme

37、nts of stockholders (equity), the higher their return (net income). Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ acti

38、ons and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers (who presumably are also higher-skill) are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen (1982) relates executives’ pay and r</p><p>　　The DEA analysi

39、s and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade an

40、d services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.</p><p>

41、　　5.Empirical Results</p><p>　　The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers

42、promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individua

43、ls are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions </p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　The empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals th

44、at ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:</p><p>　　Out of a

45、ll organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appear least efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, a

46、nd when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.</p><p>　　(2)Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-ma

47、naged firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance. </p><p>　　Critical readers

48、 may wonder how come “efficient” and “less-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family (and partnership cont

49、rolled) firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.</p><p>　　A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would

50、gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its

51、 application (Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance). Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research sh</p><p>&l

52、t;b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　股權結構與公司業績</b></p><p>　　資料來源：管理治理雜志 作者：貝尼·勞特巴赫和亞歷山大·范尼斯基 </p><p>　　多年來，在許多經濟體中的大多數商業活動是由獨資企業、合伙企業或者非公開企業操作管理的。在這些企業組織形

53、式中，有一種小型的與個人密切相關的屬于同一家庭或有長期業務合作的團體經營公司并分享公司的利潤。</p><p>　　然而，在最近的世紀，一種新的企業組織以非集中所有制的企業結構應運而生并蓬勃發展?，F代多種所有制企業已經打破了所有權和公司積極管理之間的環節?，F代企業通常都是由職業經理人管理運行，他們僅代表性地擁有很少一部分的股份份額。此外，所有權分散，就是說公司由股東擁有并且其利潤在所有股東間進行派發?，F代公司的優

54、勢是多方面的。它可以緩解融資難問題，使公司能夠承擔較大規模的經營和利用規模經濟。它還有助于復合式運營，使得最有技能的管理者或專家來控制交易，即使他們（職業經理）沒有足夠的資金來擁有自己的公司?，F代企業在資本市場中籌集資金（出售普通股），并將它們分配給職業經理的生產活動。這就是為什么現代多種所有制企業比傳統“封閉型”的經營形式要運行得好的假設是合理的。</p><p>　　干擾現代企業運營的因素依然存在。例如，少數

55、人持股公司可發出少數股票籌集資金，擴大業務。更重要的是，現代企業面臨一個嚴峻的新問題——代理問題：管理企業日常經營活動的職業代理人有參與股東的最佳利益分配問題的一個機會。該代理問題源于現代企業所有權和控制權的分離，在這之前它困擾許多經濟學家（例如，伯利和手段，1932年；詹森和麥克林，1976年法瑪和詹森1983）。結論是企業需要有建立一個監控系統或合同，隨著財富和所有者（股東）福利的變動來調整管理者的利益和行為。</p>

56、<p>　　代理型問題也存在與封閉型企業，因為總是有少數決策者存在。不過，在這些企業的所有者和管理者之間建立個人關系，并給予更密切的監督，封閉型企業的代理問題一般來說也不太嚴重。代理問題的存在削弱了中心論點——現代企業所有權開放更有效。這可能是一些業務部門的監控和管理者交涉合作的成本會過高。這也可能在某些情況下，規?；洜I和專業管理的優勢將是輕微的，而其不足超過了預期的代理成本。然而，對多種所有制企業的歷史潮流的分析，我們堅

57、持多種所有制企業比封閉型所有制企業運行得更好的這一假設。我們認為，對多種所有制企業的趨勢分析是合理的，并可以通過績效的增加來解釋。</p><p>　　現代企業最重要的標志之一是所有權和控制權的分離?，F代企業通常是由只擁有一小部分股份份額的職業經理人來運行的。關于所有權與控制權分離的影響和價值，在一些專著中一直都是一個的爭論。早期的理論家如威廉姆森（1964），提出非所有者的經營者相對于成為股東來說寧愿選擇他們自

58、己的興趣。因此，非所有者經營的企業比所有者經營的企業的效率變小了。</p><p>　　較近期的文獻重新審視這一問題和預測結果。它指出存在一類機構，來減緩非最優預期和經營者的自私行為。例如，法瑪（1980）認為，管理勞動力市場的有效性和競爭，能減少管理人員作出一些不負責行為的可能性。此外，外部董事在董事會的存在約束管理行為。其他，像墨菲（1985）建議生成薪酬管理與企業績效掛鉤的行政補償方案，幫助企業分配經營者利

59、益。因此，非所有者經理的企業的效率才會不低于所有者經營的企業。最有趣的是，德姆塞茨和萊恩（1985）的結論是，股權結構方式的變化與價值最大化一致。也就是說，當多種所有制和非所有制管理的企業變得更有價值時，他們就會出現。</p><p>　　關于這一問題的實證是復雜的（見Short（1994）摘要）。各種不同的結果的一部分可以歸因于之前的研究顯示在所有者和非所有者管理控制公司區別的標準差。這些標準，通常以大股東所有

60、權的百分比為基礎，比最初認為的更成問題，因為正如Morck，Shleifer和Vishny（1988）和Mc Connell和Servaes（1990）證明的那樣，所有權比例和公司績效的關系是非線性的。此外，為描述控制結構，僅出現所有權比例是不充分的。大股東總持股比率相同的兩個公司很可能有不同的控制機構，這取決于大股東的特性。</p><p>　　在這項研究中，我們利用昂，豪瑟和Lauterbach（1997）提

61、出所有權分級方案。這項計劃區分非所有者經營的企業，由家族控制的企業和以個人（合作伙伴）集團控制的企業。顯然，控制結構在每種公司類型下是不同的。因此，在股權結構與公司績效的關系可能會出現一些新的觀點。</p><p>　　我們從一個發展中的經濟體——以色列中采用數據，因為以色列有不少的企業組織形式能夠并存。樣本選取了1994年間在特拉維夫證券交易所（特拉維夫）上市交易的280家上市公司。對于每一個公司，我們收集的數

62、據包括1992年到1994年的3年凈收入（稅后收入），1994年的總資產，1994年的股票，1994年高層管理人員的薪酬和1994年股權結構。除了按照股權結構分類的企業數據外，所有數據均摘自出版在由以色列證券管理局頒發的“利益方控股”、“Meitav股票指南”和“金球獎財務報告聯交所年鑒”上的企業財務報告。</p><p>　　樣品中的公司代表了豐富多樣的股權結構。簡單來說，9%的公司沒有任何大股東。在大多數國有

63、企業中，個人（家族或合伙企業）擁有72％的所有權，其余是由控制問題。約一半（49％）的單獨控制的公司是由個人合伙的，其余（51％）是由家族控制為主。發現約15％的單獨控制企業聘請了專業（非所有者）的首席執行官。因此以色列的數據樣本能較為全面的分析股權結構與公司績效的關系。</p><p>　　以色列的280家公司的實證分析表明，股權結構影響公司業績，其中表現為該公司的實際凈收益除以該公司投入的最佳凈收益的估計比值

64、。我們發現：</p><p>　　剔除所有的組織形式，家族所有者經營企業在創造利潤方面的效率最低。當涉及到所有的企業時，只有所有者經營的家族企業有一個不到30％的平均績效分數；而當績效測量涉及到業務部門時，只有所有者經營的家族企業有不到50％的平均得分。</p><p>　　非所有者經營企業的表現比所有者經營的企業更好。這些發現表明，現代企業的組織形式，即伴隨著分散所有權和非所有者經營的開

65、放型企業，能夠提高績效。批判性的讀者可能想知道“有效率的”和“低效率的”的組織結構是怎么并存的。答案是，我們也許不能用文件證明一個長期得的均衡情況。較低績效的家族企業（合伙企業）很可能隨著時間的推移，轉變成受控制的非多數人擁有的上市公司。</p><p>　　一些保留意見有序排列。首先，我們不認為每一家企業轉變成所有權分散的上市公司都能獲益。例如，很顯然的，發展初期的企業通常所有權集中密切發展時經濟狀況最好。其次