在印度的企業界的保險與股權結構【外文翻譯】

1、本科畢業論文（設計）外文翻譯原文：原文：InsuranceownershipstructureinIndia’scpatesectAsnotedearliercpateownershipstructureisessentiallyagovernancemechanismwhichinfluencesthewaymanagerialperfmanceismonitedcontrolledindertoensurecompliancewit

2、howners’wealthmaximizationobjectives(PearceThomsenZouHoytMayersZouZouetal.2003)suggestthatpropertyinsurancecanbeaneffectivestrategicpostlossinvestmentfinancingmechanismthatcanhelpreduceinfmationasymmetriesfinancialdistre

3、ssbankruptcyother(e.g.agency)costsffirms.Inthisregardmanagersmaybemotivatedtopurchasepropertyinsuranceindertoprotectpromotetheirjobsecurity.TheanalysisofFrootcolleagues(1993)furtherimpliesthatbyprotectingfirms’freecashfl

4、owsintheeventofunexpectedlyseverelosseventspropertyinsuranceenablesmanagerstorealizepotentiallypositivepresentvalue(NPV)projectsinthefirm’sinvestmentopptunitysettherebyaddingvaluefPacificregionarenotdeepliquidmarketsbyin

5、ternationalstards.InadditioninthecontextofIndiatheissueofpublicequityisstrictlycontrolledbytheSecuritiesExchangeBoardofIndia(SEBI)setupin1992(Chakrabarthietal.2008).Asnotedearlierbanksinmanymajemergingeconomiesarenowincr

6、easinglyrequiringcompaniestoinsurecollaterizedassetsasaconditionofthegrantingofloans.ConsistentwiththissituationZouAdams(2008a)findthatthepurchaseofpropertyinsurancebyChinesePLCsenablesmanagerstoexpdebtcapacitylowerinter

7、estcostsfinancegrowthdevelopment.Arelatedbenefitisthatexpeddebtcapacityresultingfromincreasingthelevelofpropertyinsurancecoverageonassetsinplacemayaffdbrowingfirmsalargerinteresttaxshieldbenefittherebybeingpotentiallyval

8、ueincreasingfshareholders.Ownershipstructurecouldbeanimptantconsiderationonthedecisionoflenderstorequirebrowerstobothtakeoutinsurancethelevelofinsurancepurchased.Fexamplesmallfamilyownedfirmswithconcentratedriskarelikely

9、toberequiredbytheirbankstoinsuretakeoutrelativelymeinsurancethanlargemultinationalcompaniesStateownedfirmsthatarebetterabletodiversifytheriskoflosses.Inthefollowingsectionsweconsiderhowpropertyinsurancedecisionsinteractw

10、ithparticularaspectsoftheownershipcontrolstructureofIndianfirms.Weputfwardfourhypothesestoguideempiricaltesting.ShareholderownershipZheka(2005:452)reptsthatindevelopingeconomiessuchasIndiacompanyownershipstructurecansign

11、ificantlyaffectfinancialperfmancebyinfluencingmanagerialincentivessystemsofmonitingcontrolthestrategicdecisionmakingprocess.Asnotedearliershareholdersthatholdahighproptionoftheirwealthinafirm(e.g.asisoftenthecasewithfami

12、lyfirms)arelikelytohavelessdiversifiedptfoliosthaninvestswithwidelyheldshareholdings(Zou&Adams2008a).Asaresultthemanagersoffirmswithconcentratedshareownershiparemelikelytotransferrisktothirdpartiesusinginsurancethantheir